**Chapter 2: A Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program built by “Science, Industry, and the Administration”**

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**Introduction**

This chapter argues that the period immediately following Wyhl Protests in February 1975 to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s end of the year address in December 1976 was formative in bringing together a coalition of actors who would champion the pro-nuclear argument and characterize the national debate. In the immediate shock of the massive protests at Wyhl, Schmidt and his ministers acknowledged that passing the Fourth Atomic Energy Program through the Bundestag and state legislatures did not give it enough legitimacy for the public to accept it as the future of German energy policy. Overall, this chapter explains how Schmidt and his pro-nuclear allies reorganized the public debate after Wyhl and why they felt confident continuing their course despite public increasing opposition. The protests at Wyhl had elevated the nuclear energy debate to a national one, and Schmidt and his ministers would need to build an alliance of pro-nuclear advocates to convince the public about the Fourth Atomic Energy Program’s viability moving forward. In crafting this alliance, Schmidt openly declared in the summer of 1975 that the West German nuclear energy program would be successful and built on the foundation of “industry, science, and administration.” He portrayed the nuclear energy program as having overwhelming support from energy industrialist, engineers, physicists, scientists, and the political parties.[[1]](#footnote-1) Schmidt also began characterizing the debate as one of science versus fearmongering, expertise against uninformed opinions. Schmidt and other ministers did this in speeches, publications, and letters from the Chancellor’s Office, and most importantly, the public relations campaign, “Citizens' Dialog on Nuclear Energy” (*Bürgerdialog Kernenergie*), led by Hans Matthöfer and the Ministry of Research and Technology. In addition to these efforts, Schmidt and his ministers also tasked the federal press office and other West German non-government research institutions to conduct surveys to learn how voters felt about nuclear energy and what issues resonated the most with them. By December 1976, Schmidt’s pro-nuclear coalition, which consisted of members of his cabinet, the leadership of the Social Democratic Party/Free Democratic Party (SPD/FDP) Coalition, energy policy internationalists, technological experts, and energy corporate leaders, felt confident to resume construction of the largest reactor to date in West Germany at Brokdorf, despite reinvigorated anti-nuclear resistance.

To demonstrate Schmidt’s and his cabinet’s efforts to increasingly characterize the debate as science against emotion and to build a pro-nuclear coalition, I draw on sources from the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, the Federal Ministry of Economics, the German Foreign Office, the Chancellor’s Office, as well as West German and French newspapers and weekly journals. Additionally, I draw on personal correspondence from the Helmut Schmidt archives and materials from the archives of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Overall, the period analyzed in this chapter is crucial to understanding the evolution of the West German nuclear energy debate. Wyhl produced an establishment vs. anti-establishment nature to the debate. Schmidt and his pro-nuclear allies believed that their program being built and marketed with a foundation of “industry, science, and administration,” supported by an extensive media campaign, would be enough to convince the increasingly skeptical West German voters. With this pro-nuclear foundation, extensive media campaign, and understanding of German pro-nuclear sentiment, which was supported by data from multiple surveys, Schmidt and Matthöfer approved the reactor construction plan at Brokdorf for 1977. Believing they had public support, Schmidt and Matthöfer would instead create the environment for one of the largest anti-nuclear protests in German history.

**Matthöfer Responds to the Protests at Wyhl**

On March 6, 1975, almost three weeks after the protests at Wyhl broke out, Hans Matthöfer led the series of government responses to the anti-nuclear protests. He utilized an address at the INTERATOM international nuclear energy symposium in Bensberg to comment on the need for a public dialogue about nuclear energy and the federal government’s next steps. Matthöfer took an empathetic approach to the concerns of many of the protestors and promised to establish a massive informational program to address the questions that many voters had. This media campaign would discuss nuclear energy alongside other West German energy needs and would “gives all those involved…the opportunity to give an account and to inform themselves about the status of what has been achieved so far and the problems that lie ahead.”[[2]](#footnote-2) Furthermore, Matthöfer sought to dispel the notion that the government was not interested in citizens’ concerns or that it was trying to dictate a dangerous program without the public’s consent. He continued, “We live in a state of capable citizens who do not allow themselves to be planned at will. They want to be factually informed, they want to be sufficiently involved in decisions about their living environment and they do not blindly trust political or technocratic authorities.”[[3]](#footnote-3) Furthermore, Matthöfer emphasized that while the “the public debate on the dangers and environmental impact of nuclear energy cannot be taken seriously enough”, West Germany still needed to meet its energy demands and that the nuclear energy program would continue.[[4]](#footnote-4) Matthöfer assured his listeners that the Chancellor and ministers would not have approved a program that was reckless or dangerous but that the government’s response and media campaign would not “trivialize the concerns of prudent citizens about their health, the environment and, in some cases, their livelihoods.”[[5]](#footnote-5) From this speech, Matthöfer made it clear that while the protests had caught the chancellor, federal ministers, and other members of the Fourth Atomic Energy Program off guard, it would still proceed. Schmidt and his ministers committed to the effort to educate the public about the necessity of nuclear energy and assure them atomic energy’s safety moving forward. Furthermore, they would need to affirm support from the Social Democrats (SPD) and Free Democrats (FDP) in the Bundestag before moving forward. Nevertheless, the aftermath of Wyhl did not deter the pro-nuclear advocates , and the ministers stood behind the plan.

The response in the media to Matthöfer’s speech was less than encouraging. Newspapers in West Germany and France commented on the protests as well as the federal government’s response. Many of the weekly newspapers published articles critical of the government’s response and of the chaos that developed at the site because of the state government’s actions. Matthöfer received the Düsseldorf edition of *Handelsblatt* to gauge public feedback*. In it* journalist Eberhard Wisdorff wrote an extensive article titled “Dangerous Nuclear Energy” that criticized the Fourth Atomic Energy Program and Matthöfer’s approach to the protests. In particular, Wisdorff disapproved of Matthöfer’s response and asked readers, “But what should the increasingly worried population - rightly or wrongly - make of the fact that Research Minister Matthöfer … considers the concerns of the winegrowers in the Upper Rhine region to be justified… and thus discredits a completed approval procedure that has the safety and environmental blessing of the authorities?”[[6]](#footnote-6) Wisdorff continued on that “the federal government cannot allow itself to publicly debate the sense or nonsense of a nuclear power plant project in the face of a disgruntled population. In doing so, it is encouraging the process of irritation that increasingly accompanies such projects.”[[7]](#footnote-7) Wisdorff conceded that West Germany needed to meet its energy needs and that nuclear energy was projected to provide almost half of West Germany’s demand by 1985, but these goals would only see increased opposition by encouraging debate, especially after the number of protestors that appeared in Wyhl. Wisdorff was not alone in criticizing Matthöfer or the West German government. Overall, the early responses of the government officials and figures in the media criticizing them indicated that the Wyhl protest had indeed triggered an international debate surrounding nuclear energy, and the sides were now being drawn.

**The Social Democratic and Free Democratic Parties Close Ranks Around Nuclear Energy**

Helmut Schmidt and Hans Matthöfer affirmed their support for the nuclear energy program and now turned to consolidating support within the ruling parties in the Bundestag and the various state ministers in West Germany. In order to proceed, they needed to reaffirm the support of the the Social Democratic Party and Free Democratic Party coalition to continue their momentum for the pro-nuclear forces. Schmidt and Matthöfer were already members of the SPD, but the party leader was the former chancellor, Willy Brandt. On March 14, 1975, the SPD and FDP, led by the Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, issued internal memos with the major decision to affirm their support for the Fourth Atomic Energy Program and to continue investing in nuclear energy. The parties also recognized the necessity to address the concerns raised by the Wyhl protestors in hopes of defusing tensions before this opposition grew in strength. The SPD leadership encouraged support for Helmut Schmidt’s program but also acknowledged that the federal government needed to address voters’ concerns regarding nuclear energy. The immediate aftermath of the Wyhl Protests offered a moment to address “a feeling of mistrust” and moving forward without addressing this feeling would provoke “an irrationally justified defensive stance against the planned measures. This [mistrust] is further reinforced if the plant manufacturer and the approving authority are in some way intertwined.”[[8]](#footnote-8) To unify the SPD/FDP coalition and West German voters behind the Chancellor’s nuclear energy program, the SPD party leadership acknowledged the need for a public discussion with voters regarding nuclear energy. The memo continued, “there is a need for an open and public, unprejudiced discussion of the problems associated with the introduction of nuclear energy. Only objective discussion and information about the necessity of building nuclear power plants and the associated risks can create the conditions for the acceptability of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the long term.”[[9]](#footnote-9) Consequently, the SPD leadership called for Schmidt and his ministers to take the lead on this “objective discussion” to reassure voters about the safety and necessity of nuclear energy all while rallying behind him and his program.

To deal with the immediate public relations debacle surrounding Wyhl, the SPD and FDP leadership denounced the violence of the protests and instructed Bundestag representatives to begin shifting blame away from Schmidt, his ministers, and the Fourth Atomic Energy Program. Instead, party leadership instructed representatives to blame the Minister-President of Baden-Württemberg, Hans Filbinger. The problems that developed at Wyhl, according to the SPD and FDP memo, were not with nuclear energy or its safety. Instead, members were to focus on how the situation spiraled out of control due to the actions of Filbinger and his rhetoric.[[10]](#footnote-10) The memo went on stating “Anyone who stirs up and escalates hostilities…instead of contributing to a rational discussion about the problems of energy supply and the construction of nuclear power plants, is endangering the internal peace in our country. Anyone who, like Mr. Filbinger, describes the population of the Kaiserstuhl as 'communist-controlled fellow travelers and as vicarious agents of non-local political extremists' is not only defaming, but also demonstrating how he classifies civic criticism.”[[11]](#footnote-11) Therefore, in the immediate aftermath of the Wyhl anti-nuclear protest, the ruling coalition within the Bundestag, SPD and FDP party leadership, affirmed its support in nuclear energy and provided Schmidt with the first key group in constructing his pro-nuclear energy coalition.

After securing support within the Bundestag, Schmidt then called for a meeting among the nine state-ministers, the leaders of the nine states within West Germany, to secure their support for continuing the Fourth Atomic Energy Program. On April 24, 1975, Schmidt met with the nine minister-presidents and emphasized that the state governments needed to “stand together in the implementation of the energy program,” and “that it was not just about Baden-Württemberg and not just about nuclear powerplants.”[[12]](#footnote-12) For Schmidt, the nuclear energy debate was also about securing the energy needs of West German voters as well as demonstrating that the West German democratic institutions were capable of handling crises. Schmidt vowed that he would “take a deeper look at the problems of environmental protection, economy, and job security” but that the nuclear energy program would proceed with its planned construction projects.

The next major reactor slated to break ground was the Brokdorf reactor in the province of Schleswig-Holstein in November 1976. During the meeting, Gerhard Stoltenberg, the Minister-President of the Schleswig-Holstein, raised his concerns about proceeding with this construction and told the Chancellor that “the situation at Brokdorf on the Elbe seems to be repeating itself. Stoltenberg requested that there be a cohesive rhetoric regarding nuclear energy and requested a delay in breaking ground at Brokdorf until more information was gathered about the concerns of voters in the region. Schmidt agreed that he wanted to avoid another disaster like the one at Wyhl but was “of the opinion that not everything was done according to the rules of the art in Wyhl.”[[13]](#footnote-13) To avoid many of the issues at Wyhl, the federal government would introduce a massive public relations campaign that would raise awareness of the safety and feasibility of nuclear energy. Furthermore, Schmidt emphasized that the pro-nuclear energy campaign would be built by emphasizing the role of “industry, science, and administration.”[[14]](#footnote-14) These groups would be the backbone of pro-nuclear advocates under Schmidt’s government, and moving forward, he would rely on the perception of these groups supporting nuclear energy to sell the Fourth Atomic Energy Program to West German voters. Furthermore, by consolidating support among the parties in the Bundestag and the state-ministers, Schmidt and Matthöfer had solidified the administration behind the nuclear energy plan and now began turning to rally support from the industrial and scientific experts.

**Schmidt Expands the Pro-Nuclear Coalition to Include Engineers and Industrialists**

The month of July in 1975 offered two major developments for Schmidt and his efforts to solidify a pro-nuclear coalition: a keynote speech to the Association of German Engineers and the successful establishment of a West German government and energy companies consortium to create a new nuclear fuel corporation. After securing support of the political establishment, Schmidt turned to gain the backing of one of the largest engineering groups in the Federal Republic, the German Association of Engineers. On July 4th, 1975, Schmidt made a statement by being the keynote speaker and first German Chancellor to participate in the German Engineer’s Day, hosted by the German Association of Engineers (*Verein Deutscher Ingenieure - VDI).* Schmidt commended the VDI for playing an important role in making Germany a technologically advanced society over the last 100 years and emphasized the need to keep the Federal Republic of Germany as a technological leader in the world.[[15]](#footnote-15) More importantly, Schmidt commended the VDI engineers because they had a long history of understanding the “social responsibility of engineers” to calm fears surrounding new technologies.[[16]](#footnote-16)

Schmidt then emphasized that one of the biggest issues facing West German society was the “clear gap between the technical and political worlds…. Ultimately, in a democratic society, everyone speaks the way they feel; and if you don’t open your mouth, you won’t be heard. You can’t wait to be asked. Sometimes there are situations where you have to give your advice. *I would strongly encourage you to do so* [emphasis added]*.*”[[17]](#footnote-17) In his speech, Schmidt encouraged engineers to get active in the emerging public debate regarding nuclear energy and to emphasize that new technology was not as dangerous as many anti-nuclear activists claimed. Furthermore, Schmidt was now publicly characterizing the nuclear energy debate as one of science and expertise versus opinions and emotions. The Chancellor acknowledged the importance of public debate in democratic societies, but he began characterizing the anti-nuclear forces as driven solely by opinions and scaremongering. Schmidt continued:

Society as a whole would be better served if we learned to distinguish more clearly between preconceived opinions…. We don't need any scaremongering. We are grown up enough to face up to the real necessities without scaremongering. Fear-mongering can obscure our view of the necessary solutions. In all these cases, you - technicians and engineers in the broadest sense, chemists, physicists, and so on - are called upon. You mainly have to pay attention in good times and point out possible future risks in good time. How are politicians supposed to recognize whether there is a technical risk somewhere? They have to tell the politicians. You have to talk to us if you think you have discovered future risks or risky side effects of a technology.[[18]](#footnote-18)

In addition to mobilizing engineers to get involved in politics, Schmidt was now calling for other experts in technicians, chemists, and physicists to address the concerns regarding nuclear energy -- to point out the risks, but also dispel fearmongering among the public.

 Schmidt closed his speech with a call for action and specifically addressed the nuclear energy debate within West Germany. He acknowledged that the Fourth Atomic Energy Program had been met “with opposition, not least because those who are technically and scientifically involved with it have not yet been able to make themselves comprehensible.”[[19]](#footnote-19) But Schmidt was optimistic for the future. The Chancellor concluded that West German engineers and experts played key roles in West Germany’s prosperity in the postwar period because they were active in their democracy and their communities. Once again, Schmidt declared that “We need engineers in politics!”[[20]](#footnote-20)

Helmut Schmidt’s VDI speech demonstrates that the Chancellor perceived the nuclear energy debate as one of science and expertise against fearmongering and opinions. Furthermore, Schmidt sought to build stronger ties with engineers and to portray his policies as being technocratic and rational. The Chancellor also sought to mobilize engineers to become active in their support for his program and to start playing a more dynamic role in combating fears about nuclear energy and the new forms of reactor technology. Lastly, Schmidt’s VDI speech also demonstrates an intentional nod to attach a peaceful pride in German identity by emphasizing the relationship between West Germany’s advanced technology and its prosperity. For Schmidt, a successful nuclear energy program would not only strengthen the West German economy and trust in democratic institutions to solve the energy crisis, but it would make West Germany a technology world leader , specifically peaceful nuclear technology.

 Ten days after his speech with the VDI, Schmidt’s Fourth Atomic Energy Program secured another major ally in the form of 12 major energy companies that comprised more than 90% of the West German energy market.[[21]](#footnote-21) These large companies from across West Germany agreed to form and fund a new company called the “Project Company for the Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuel” (*Projektgesellschaft Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen*) with the West German federal government to manage the nuclear reactors and provide energy to West German citizens.[[22]](#footnote-22) On July 14, the West German Ministry of Economics issued a press release alongside representatives from these corporations announcing the creation and funding of a new consortium company,specifically to create a complete fuel cycle for West Germany’s nuclear energy grid. Building reactors was a key component of the nuclear energy cycle but to establish a complete fuel cycle, there needed to also be a series of processing centers that could handle nuclear waste as well as reprocessing some of the waste to extract fuel for the reactors. Because of the radioactive dangers that came with spent fuel, the Fourth Atomic Energy Program called for a unique company to be created and overseen by the federal government but operated by private companies. Furthermore, the government’s program called for private corporations to operate the reactors and assist in their construction but not to manage them. They established this consortium to quell suspicions that corporations would adopt cost-saving and risky measures with nuclear waste and spent fuel. This special designation for this consortium allowed for the 12 corporations to operate in a free-market style in determining prices and other policies for their companies but with the federal government maintaining strict safety regulations for nuclear waste disposal. The corporations that signed on agreed to form a board that would finalize how much each corporation would fund each fuel cycle. But for Schmidt and the Ministry of Economics, this decision also guaranteed additional funding for the program and tied tens of thousands of jobs to safeguarding the fuel process for West Germany’s nuclear energy. The 12 companies also allocated 30 million Deutsche Marks toward construction and administrative costs to establish the new consortium as well as create research centers for more efficient methods of extracting fuel from the spent nuclear waste. In the press brief, the consortium partners agreed to collaborate and share safety technology with each other and to specifically “make every effort to ensure… the construction and operation of facilities for the reprocessing and storage of nuclear fuel” to aid in the successful implementation of the Fourth Atomic Energy Program.[[23]](#footnote-23) Thes addition of these 12 energy corporations into the pro-nuclear coalition served as a major success for Schmidt in his quest to build the nuclear energy program on the foundation of “industry, science, and administration,” but it also raised many questions from West German voters and the political representatives in the Bundestag.

 To defend this budding alliance between corporations and the federal government, Schmidt tasked his Minister of the Interior, Werner Maihofer, to answer questions and stress the benefits of this collaboration. On July 16, two days after the announcement of the new consortium agreement, Maihofer submitted a letter to be read on the floor of the Bundestag. The promptness of the reply and depth of the letter suggest that concern among voters and representatives were anticipated but Maihoffer, and his office offered more than 30 pages of details. The letter emphasized the benefits of the federal government working with corporations to build this energy program and stressed that this would aid in addressing safety procedures. Maihofer echoed Hans Matthöfer’s rhetoric about the federal government being eager to answer questions from its citizens and stressed that the Fourth Atomic Energy Program was not being carried out recklessly or imposed against voters’ will.[[24]](#footnote-24) In opening his letter, Maihofer wrote:

The Federal Government welcomes the debate on the peaceful use of nuclear energy in our country….With the difficult decisions in the nuclear energy sector… the trust of citizens in the federal and state governments responsible for these decisions is essential….However, the Federal Government is of the opinion that the important safety and ecological problems of nuclear energy in particular have been clarified to such an extent that the use of this form of energy makes sense for the Federal Republic of Germany and is compatible with the protection of the population from danger.[[25]](#footnote-25)

In a similar manner to Schmidt and Matthöfer, Maihofer’s tone indicated an understanding for the importance of a public debate but also indicated that the atomic energy program was proceeding despite reservations. In a different tactic, however, Maihofer’s letter posed common questions or concerns and specifically sought to address the need fornuclear energymoving forward. The Minister of the Interior explained that some anti-nuclear protesters had asked for the government to seek other energy sources or to embrace a complete moratorium on nuclear energy altogether. According to Maihofer, alternative sources of energy were an option, but coal could not be expanded, hydro energy had reached its capacity, and the technology for other forms was still in development. The only viable alternative that West Germany could heavily turn to was natural gas.[[26]](#footnote-26) If the West German government turned to natural gas, however, it would need to be imported, forcing West Germany into a similar situation to its reliance on crude oil with the risk of a foreign country weaponizing this resource. Therefore, for the current government, alternatives to nuclear were out of the question.

Maihofer continued explaining that a moratorium on nuclear reactor construction would be disastrous and used this question to address the importance of the budding relationship between the federal government and energy corporations. Maihofer stated that even a two-year delay on the current construction plans would create a shortfall of “around 10,000 Megawatts for the national economy by the end of 1978” and would affect “numerous companies, particularly in the electrical, mechanical, engineering, and chemical industries” and more than 35,000 full time employees.[[27]](#footnote-27) The number of jobs potentially be affected by a delay did not include part-time employees or sub-contractors, and Maihofer highlighted that even more jobs would be created as the Fourth Atomic Energy Program progressed. A cessation of nuclear energy operations would also impede West Germany to maintain its position as a leader in technology. The previous programs had allowed West Germany to catch up to other nations’ nuclear energy capabilities and the Fourth Atomic Energy Program would allow West Germany to be at the forefront of certain reactor technologies. Halting the program would dry up funding for research and development as well as federal and private energy jobs. .[[28]](#footnote-28)

Moreover, in his letter, Maihofer stressed that further collaboration between energy corporations and the federal government would prevent mistakes like the ones that happened at Wyhl. Maihofer explained that the “federal government has repeatedly pointed out that it considers the implementation of long-term site planning by the states to be one of the essential prerequisites for the realization of the federal government's energy program…. This includes, in particular, coordination with siting plans at the borders of other planning regions within the federal territory and with Germany's neighboring countries.”[[29]](#footnote-29) Maihofer’s letter indicates that the federal government was trying to portray the protests at Wyhl as more of an administrative blunder rather than having to do with nuclear energy’s safety, Furthermore, Maihofer announced that the federal government had established a new set of criteria alongside the leaders of the federal states that would streamline the process for reactor site permits and construction permits in order to avoid a repeat of the Wyhl Protests.[[30]](#footnote-30) Overall, Maihofer’s letter, coupled with SPD and FDP party leadership affirming support in the Fourth Atomic Energy Program, Schmidt’s VDI speech, and the creation of the new nuclear energy consortium company indicate that by July 1975, Schmidt’s government was eager to continue the nuclear energy program. In order to build public trust in the program, Schmidt and his ministers decided to characterize the program as being built on the foundation of industry, science, and administration, while also describing the emerging nuclear energy debate as one of science versus fearmongering. With this pro-nuclear coalition in place, Matthöfer now utilized the remainder of 1975 to organize a nationwide media campaign called the “Citizens' Dialog on Nuclear Energy” (*Bürgerdialog Kernenergie*), which would begin in earnest in January 1976. Additionally, Matthöfer tasked the Federal Press Office and the Ministry for Research and Technology to begin conducting nationwide surveys about nuclear energy in hopes of tailoring the media to convince any skeptical voters that nuclear energy was indeed a necessity for West Germany.

**“The Citizens' Dialogue on Nuclear Energy”**

 1976 was a federal election year in West Germany, and Schmidt and Matthöfer recognized the importance of their tone in discussing nuclear energy with voters if they hoped to maintain their coalition’s majority. In January 1976, after six months of preparation led by the chief organizer for the campaign, Dr. Klaus Lang, Hans Matthöfer and the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology commenced a year-long campaign dedicated at having a discussion with German voters about “the advantages and disadvantages of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.”[[31]](#footnote-31) In the first month, the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology sent out over 200,000 letters, 2000 pocket booklets, and announced more than 15 seminars and discussions as part of the media campaign to showcase the benefits of nuclear energy with more publications and events on the way. In a newsletter produced by Matthöfer, the minister emphasized that “parties, parliaments, and government should take the arguments of citizens’ initiatives seriously, address them, and respond to legitimate concerns. On the other hand, in the interests of our state’s ability to function, decisions made by our democratically legitimized institutions must also be respected….”[[32]](#footnote-32) Matthöfer’s introductory letter indicated that the Fourth Atomic Energy Program would continue as planned but that there would be an intensive effort to showcase why nuclear energy was safe and needed. Furthermore, Matthöfer explained that the government had decided on this course of action because:

According to surveys, the use of nuclear energy is approved by the majority of our country's citizens and is regarded as necessary. The Federal Government is also convinced that we in the Federal Republic of Germany will not be able to do without the use of nuclear energy, despite all efforts to save energy and to research and use new alternative energy sources. It considers the use of nuclear energy to be responsible, also from the point of view of safety and the protection of the population, according to all the facts currently available. This does not exclude, but requires, the continuous intensification of efforts in the field of reactor safety research.[[33]](#footnote-33)

While Matthöfer’s newsletter indicated that the federal government would continue with its construction efforts, it sought to ease anxieties by emphasizing the funding being diverted to reactor safety research and development. Furthermore, Matthöfer also announced that as the campaign sought to create conversation, there would be a series of public seminars and discussions in major towns and reactor sites. To demonstrate the importance of these panel discussions, Matthöfer participated in the first one on January 31 alongside a panel of other experts to “convince citizens of the necessity and safety of nuclear power plants.”[[34]](#footnote-34)

 Matthöfer’s confidence in the media campaign and belief that German citizens approved of nuclear energy use was not unfounded. In the lead up to the Citizens’ Dialogue on Nuclear Energy, Matthöfer’s office had tasked both the Federal Press Office and private research institutions to conduct surveys with German voters across the country about how they felt about nuclear energy and then to compare the results. The first major survey published and shared with Matthöfer was conducted by one of the largest commercial research institutes in West Germany, the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (*Institut für angwandte Sozialwissenschaft- INFAS).* The data in this first survey was crucial for Matthöfer understanding what the current feeling around nuclear energy was and which regions of West Germany should be targeted or avoided in future reactor construction.In their survey, INFAS asked 797 randomly selected German citizens in all major states a series of eight questions regarding their feelings on nuclear energy, the federal government’s program, and what would convince them about the safety of the program.[[35]](#footnote-35) The survey broke down respondents into categories of gender, government supporters and voting affiliation, education, age, and interest in the topic of nuclear energy. The first question was a simple identification of whether the respondents described themselves as feeling “Positive” or “Negative” toward nuclear energy. Of the 797 participants, 312 (39%) described themselves as feeling “positive” toward nuclear energy, 163 (20%) described themselves as feeling “negative” toward nuclear energy, and the remaining 322 participants (41%) identified themselves as “unsure.”[[36]](#footnote-36) This first survey question was crucial for Matthöfer and Schmidt -- it demonstrated that more German citizens felt positive about nuclear energy than negative and that 41% of voters had not yet formulated an opinion. INFAS’ survey then asked respondents, “What is your general attitude to the construction of nuclear power stations, are you more in favor, against, or is it all the same to you?”[[37]](#footnote-37) The survey broke down answers into multiple categories, but the answers broken down by each state demonstrated a trend that Matthöfer consistently referred to throughout the press campaign. Surprisingly, the responses from this survey indicated that in each German state, the number of citizens “in favor” of constructing nuclear power stations outnumbered those “not in favor.”[[38]](#footnote-38) In no state did the citizens “in favor” have a majority, however. The highest number of respondents “in favor” responded 48% in the state of Schleswig-Holstein, the site of the next reactor at Brokdorf.

The final question of the survey was written with the Wyhl Protests in mind and sought to gauge how strong pushback would be in the event of reactor construction. The survey asked, “Let’s say it is decided that a nuclear power plant will be built in the vicinity of your home, how will you react? Would you accept the decision or fight against it? What will you do then?”[[39]](#footnote-39) Matthöfer and his team saw that when the respondents were divided into their German states, more than 50% of German voters from each state except Bavaria responded that they would “accept” the construction of a nuclear powerplant.[[40]](#footnote-40) 46% of Bavarians responded reported that would “accept” the construction project. German voters from Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lower Saxony responded the most favorably with 76% saying they would “accept” construction (112 of 147 respondents). Perhaps even more shocking was that only 8% of respondents from the region reported that they would fight the construction (12 of 147 respondents) and of those 12, only one respondent said they would “take part in a demonstration against the construction” with the rest saying they would either write letters to the government, participate in a government event, or move away.[[41]](#footnote-41) Matthofer’s team gleaned from this survey that the German public either supported or were open to the expansion of nuclear energy. Furthermore, these numbers also indicated that Schleswig-Holstein, the site of the next planned reactor at Brokdorf, offered the most support for nuclear energy and the fewest amount of people to protest at a nuclear reactor construction site. This information indicated that if trends remained the same, the Brokdorf construction could commence as planned in November 1976. But, for now, Matthöfer would use this information to portray nuclear energy as having more supporters than skeptics as he began a whirlwind press tour for the Citizens Dialogue on Nuclear Energy.

**Publications, Brochures, and Other Methods of the “Citizens’ Dialogue”**

The first public discussion for the “Citizens Dialogue on Nuclear Energy” kicked off on January 31, 1976, in Essen with Matthöfer himself leading the panel discussion. Matthöfer spoke on the necessity of “cooperation with the federal states to convince interested citizens of the necessity and safety of nuclear powerplants” to more than 200 attendees.[[42]](#footnote-42) Despite the efforts to advertise the campaign, the Ministry for Research and Technology’s press team reported that there was “no commentary in the media” and that “the press coverage was not very extensive.”[[43]](#footnote-43) Matthöfer recognized the importance of extending the Citizens’ Dialogue to more than just seminars and discussions and immediately scheduled a series of interviews with major West German newspapers to discuss the questions he had received as well as the convey the major talking points of the Fourth Atomic Energy Program. Furthermore, these interviews were collected by the Federal Press Office and published into a small booklet titled *Interviews and Conversations on Nuclear Energy: Grabbing the Immortal Tiger by the Tail* and would be published in July 1976. Matthöfer’s publication mirrored the language of Schmidt and other pro-nuclear advocates in how it emphasizes the necessity for nuclear energy, the government’s awareness of concerns for health and safety, and their belief that the anti-nuclear arguments lacked in factual data. For example, Matthöfer was asked “whether we need nuclear energy at all? Can’t we cover our needs from other sources or adapt to non-nuclear supply through sensible consumption?”[[44]](#footnote-44) In his response, he emphasized the connection between energy supply, economic growth, and the energy independence that nuclear energy could provide stating “Economic growth… is linked to energy consumption…. Without nuclear energy, we would also become too dependent on an uncertain supply of oil. This is what we want to prevent.”[[45]](#footnote-45) But Matthöfer also tied the importance of nuclear energy and the economic stability it could provide to democratic institutions in West Germany, stating “the 1930s have shown how quickly economic decline leads to a self-accelerating chain reaction of unemployment, falling demand, declining investment, and new unemployment with unpredictable political consequences. Here, it would be easy to endanger not only a little luxury and standard of living, but the material foundations of our democratic state as a whole.”[[46]](#footnote-46) This was the first mention from government officials explicitly tying the memory of the economic and democratic crisis of the 1930s to the necessity for nuclear energy.

 Matthöfer also stressed the safety precautions being taken by the government and its willingness to hear voters’ concerns. When asked to summarize the position of the German government to arguments that nuclear energy posed serious risks to the health of voters and their local environments, Matthöfer emphasized the importance of the dialogue between citizens and the government and stated that the “German government is open to all arguments.”[[47]](#footnote-47) Despite this willingness to hear concerns, the Minister for Research and Technology countered anti-nuclear advocates and rejected their claims that the government was dismissive to health and safety concerns. He continued, “The SPD and FDP, for example, have expressly emphasized that measures to protect the health and life of the population are the prerequisite on which every license for nuclear facilities depends. The attitude of the federal government can be described as: Priority for safety and health….”[[48]](#footnote-48) He also went on to comment that West German reactor safety standards were among the highest in the world and even more strict than the United States’ protocols when it came to handling nuclear waste and considering potential problems that could emerge.[[49]](#footnote-49)

The last important takeaway from *Interviews and Conversations on Nuclear Energy* is Matthöfer’s depiction of anti-nuclear energy arguments as lacking reason or a factual basis. When asked about the protests at Wyhl and what the government sought to do to avoid repeating it in the future, Matthöfer emphasized the importance of providing facts into the nuclear energy debate. Matthöfer responded:

We do not want to push through nuclear energy against the will of the population, but instead to establish a broad consensus among the majority of citizens in our country. To achieve this, it is necessary to enable this majority to form a rational opinion by providing *factual information* [emphasis added]. For this reason, the federal government, together with the states, has initiated a dialog with citizens on the benefits and risks of nuclear energy, which I am charged with conducting. I hope that this dialog will initiate a discussion among the public that will secure majority support for decisions *based on reason* [emphasis added].[[50]](#footnote-50)

Matthöfer’s language implied that once voters had heard “facts” or logic-based reasoning, they would understand the importance of the nuclear energy program. Furthermore, this language also suggests that for Matthöfer, anti-nuclear reasoning was increasingly relying on emotions or opinions to connect with Germans. When asked about the German government’s position on nuclear energy, Matthöfer emphasized the role of emotion in the anti-nuclear argument.. Matthöfer’s answer dismissed there being two sides in the debate over nuclear energy and instead implied that once voters understood the “factual information” regarding nuclear energy, they would be convinced of its safety and necessity.[[51]](#footnote-51) For Matthöfer, anti-nuclear rhetoric was rooted in “emotional skepticism and the increasingly heated arguments about nuclear energy are not exactly conducive to forming an opinion about the real significance of the risk of nuclear energy. We therefore want to try and facilitate this opinion-forming by providing more *factual information* [emphasis added].”[[52]](#footnote-52) The interviews, pamphlets, and publications of the “Citizens Dialogue on Nuclear Energy” had started to characterize the debate as one of science against emotions and expertise against opinions. Furthermore, Schmidt, Maihofer, Matthöfer had all utilized rhetoric that emphasized the importance of technology, economic stability, and energy independence that would come with adopting the Fourth Atomic Energy Program.

**The Citizens’ Dialogue Garners Many Responses**

By the summer of 1976, the Fourth Atomic Energy Program had significant momentum. Between July 1976 and December 1976, significant steps were taken to maintain this momentum by planning and expanding the “Citizens Dialogue on Nuclear Energy” for 1977 and making the official decision to greenlight construction on a new generation of reactors beginning with the site at Brokdorf in Schleswig-Holstein. On July 6, 1976, the Ministry for Research and Technology sent a memo to Chancellor Schmidt’s office evaluating the first six months of the “Citizens Dialogue on Nuclear Energy.” Matthöfer and Lang proudly reported that “interest in the campaign remains high.”[[53]](#footnote-53) Within the first six months, Lang’s office also reported that over 50,000 West Germans had requested reading material with a further 13,000 requesting information about local seminars to attend.[[54]](#footnote-54) In the 10 seminars led by experts, over 500 citizens participated while more than 2000 citizens took part in the public discussions events. Furthermore, local leaders from Catholic and Evangelical churches, adult education centers, and environmental protection agencies had inquired about hosting events or discussions. Matthöfer and his team were confident about this initial response and had ordered 200,000 more booklets, such as *Interviews and Conversations on Nuclear Energy,* to share with interested readers. If the “Citizens Dialogue on Nuclear Energy” campaign was going to succeed, however, Matthöfer and his team recognized that they would need to continue coordinating with the West German state leaders and to plan for another year of their media campaign.

On July 14, the Ministry of Research and Technology hosted a meeting in Bonn to coordinate the future of the “Citizens Dialogue on Nuclear Energy” with other federal agencies and the state government leaders. Dr. Klaus Lang – appointed by Matthöfer as the head organizer of the media campaign -- led the meeting attended by representatives from the Chancellor’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Economics, and other state government representatives.[[55]](#footnote-55) Lang reported the numbers to the other ministers, and everyone present agreed that “in principle, the campaign is to be continued in 1977.”[[56]](#footnote-56) Furthermore, Lang and his team informed everyone that the Ministry for Research and Technology was also receiving roughly 100 letters per week from citizens about the nuclear energy program. As a result, the team was in the process of organizing a more frequent newsletter to answer questions. There were a few suggestions made regarding the feedback from the seminars or public discussions. Lang reported that one event had resulted in a “tense debate,” but overall the other events had not led to major protests or aggression from anti-nuclear actors and should be regarded as a success in conveying the necessity for the Forth Atomic Energy Program.[[57]](#footnote-57)

In a subsequent meeting, Lang went into more detail about the efforts to utilize West German media to impress the necessity of nuclear energy on West German voters. By the end of the year, Lang revealed that the team behind the “Citizens Dialogue on Nuclear Energy” would have placed eight advertisements and notices in West German papers that totaled more than 76 million readers, as well as a detailed question and answer article within journals that had more than 190,000 readers. When readers inquired about more materials, they would receive a tri-fold packet that would come with information listing talking points about the program as well as local events the reader could attend.

By the end of the year, the team working to promote the “Citizens Dialogue on Nuclear Energy” would end up sending out an additional 50,000 informational handouts in response to newspaper adds, and an additional 25,000 handouts for other informational materials.[[58]](#footnote-58) Furthermore, the Ministry of Research and Technology reported that it had published and distributed over 520,000 nuclear energy booklets, 250,000 of which were Matthöfer’s *Interviews and Conversations on Nuclear Energy.[[59]](#footnote-59)* In terms of events, Matthöfer’s six public discussions had drew in about 2150 participants, while the other 18 public discussions or seminars drew in roughly 1115 attendees. Lastly, 50 other government-sponsored events held by third party groups were attended by another 3000 West German voters.[[60]](#footnote-60) Overall, Lang and the bureaucrats at the Ministry for Research and Technology regarded these events as being quite successful and wanted to take the lead in planning another year for the media campaign with an emphasis on workshops in how journalists should discuss the nuclear energy debate. The ministers present all agreed that the experts at the Ministry for Research and Technology should continue to take the lead in planning and organizing the media campaign and voted to keep it in place for an additional year, which would formally be approved by the budgeting process within the Bundestag.

Perhaps the most important result of these meetings, however, was the image of success and public interest and support for nuclear energy conveyed by the media campaign. This optimism was shared with the state governments as Schmidt and his ministers sought to finalize construction decisions for the following year. On July 27, two weeks after the initial meeting, Lang sent a memo to Schmidt and Matthöfer revealing that Karl Eduard Claussen, the Minister of Social Affairs from the State of Schleswig-Holstein, had approved the site of the next reactor in Brokdorf. Lang recounted that ministers within the state government of Schleswig-Holstein were relieved by the numbers about the media campaign and Claussen wrote that “based on the expert opinions and other documents available to me, I have no fundamental objections to the site and the concept from a nuclear risk and radiological point of view and consequently to the granting of the first partial license for the Brokdorf nuclear power plant.…”[[61]](#footnote-61) Schmidt and his ministers were hopeful that this coordination would prevent a repeat of the Wyhl Protests but agreed that any construction would not begin until November due to the Federal elections scheduled for October 3.. With the next site for construction secured and the “Citizens’ Dialogue” campaign in full swing, Schmidt and his pro-nuclear allies felt confident about the prospects for their nuclear energy program. This confidence was strengthened when West Germans went to the polls on October 3, 1976, and reelected Chancellor Schmidt’s SPD-FDP coalition. Furthermore, the Fourth Atomic Energy Program’s future was assured, and the next four years guaranteed that the nuclear energy debate would continue.

**The Resurgence of Anti-Nuclear Protests**

Despite the results of the federal election and momentum of the pro-nuclear movement, Schmidt and Matthöfer faced a resurgent anti-nuclear resistance at the Brokdorf reactor site. This showing served as a reminder of the reality that not all Germans were on board with the Atomic Energy Program. On October 30, within hours of the Brokdorf reactor receiving its official construction permit, over 5000 protestors showed up to the reactor site and made headlines as they sought to halt construction in a similar manner to Wyhl. Chancellor Schmidt had instructed the Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein, Gerhard Stoltenberg, to have police on hand and when the protestors arrived at the reactor site, over 400 officers, 12 motorcycle officers, 12 officers with dogs, and three water cannons were in place.[[62]](#footnote-62) In the memos sent to Schmidt and Matthöfer from the local Bundestag representative and local police, the anti-nuclear protestors started as roughly 150 local farmers but “Left-wing extremist group, such as KBW (Communist League of West Germany), the KPD (German Communist Party), and the KPD/ML (German Communist Party/Marxists-Leninists) had also joined the rally” and by 3pm, the estimated demonstration was around 5000 participants.[[63]](#footnote-63) Furthermore, the protest turned violent as the memo outlined that “around 45 demonstrators and one police officer were injured during the occupation of the site and subsequent clearing of the area.”[[64]](#footnote-64) Once again, West German newspapers picked up the story and printed images of the violent clashes between police and protestors. On November 3, readers of the liberal-leaning *Süddeutsche Zeitung* were faced with a headline: “Nuclear Power Splits the Constitutional State.”[[65]](#footnote-65) Journalist Christian Schütze chastised the government’s response and wrote:

The term ‘nuclear fascism’ has existed for quite a while. It has not made its way into public discussion yet because only very few people have any idea what it means. You can get a sense of its meaning from the conflict over the construction site at Brokdorf on the lower Elbe River. The onslaught of hundreds of police with gas masks, dogs, and water cannons, the bulldozers closing up the ranks, and barbed wire entanglements being rolled out made a lasting impression on anyone who watched the special report on NDR television on Sunday evening….Even more significant were the mass psychology of the accompaniment and the self-assured interplay of the power company, the state government, the security organs, and the police.[[66]](#footnote-66)

This article reflects the beginning of the anti-nuclear response to Schmidt’s Fourth Atomic Energy program being built on the foundation of industry, science, and the administration. In contrast, anti-nuclear protestors began to characterize Schmidt’s program as one being built by the state, police, and power companies to engage in “nuclear fascism.” Furthermore, Schütze’s article panned the government’s justification for force by associating far-left Communists being involved. The article continued, “If there are some communists among the demonstrators, companies and authorities enjoy taking the opportunity to discredit a democratically permitted free expression of opinion without any further arguments. First, it should be asked if communists in our country represent the legendary sourdough that – added in small amounts – makes any protest action by assembled democrats irrelevant?”[[67]](#footnote-67) The article also reflects the growing anti-nuclear arguments that Chancellor Schmidt’s response to nuclear energy concerns was to use force to enact the program rather than genuinely seeking to engage in a dialogue. Recognizing the potential repeat of events at Wyhl and seeing thousands of West Germans flocking to Brokdorf Schmidt and Matthöfer agreed that a construction delay was the best idea moving forward. For pro-nuclear advocates, the Brokdorf protests revealed that the anti-nuclear protestors were still organized and were actively responding to the pro-nuclear rhetoric. Anti-nuclear arguments were now beginning to link the relationship between the state, policing, and nuclear power companies as being “nuclear fascists,” deliberately evoking the image of the Nazi past in the public nuclear energy debate. Consequently, Brokdorf construction would be delayed until February 1977.

Schmidt made clear his determination to forge ahead with the nuclear energy program and the Brokdorf construction project with his end of the year address to the Bundestag on December 16, 1976. The Chancellor reiterated that to meet energy demands, “we cannot do without the expansion of nuclear energy.”[[68]](#footnote-68) In a similar fashion to other speeches, Schmidt emphasized that the federal government prioritized safety in its decisions and pledged continued support to the states and their leaders in nuclear reactor construction. But in concluding his remarks, he framed the protests as no longer being a genuine discussion about nuclear energy. Instead, they represented an increasingly coordinated effort of nefarious far-left actors seeking to destroy the efforts of the state. Schmidt stated, “protest movements are entitled to fair treatment by the state authorities, and they must not be sidelined… On the other hand, where extremists and hooligans sneak into citizens initiatives and protest groups and compromise them, we expect clear lines of separation! Here, everyone is allowed to demonstrate, but no one is allowed to demolish.”[[69]](#footnote-69) Chancellor Schmidt made it clear that while he understood the importance for discussion, he was drawing his party’s line in the sand, declaring that anti-nuclear sentiment was being supported by far-left actors, and their violent and disruptive efforts would no longer be tolerated.

**Conclusion**

Overall, the period of February 1975 to December 1976 was crucial for the development of a pro-nuclear coalition in the West German nuclear energy debate. In this time, Chancellor Schmidt, Hans Matthöfer, and other ministers reacted to the shocking protests at Wyhl by building a coalition of pro-nuclear advocates and shaping the public debate surrounding nuclear energy. Schmidt and Matthöfer sought to convince the public of the necessity and viability of the Forth Atomic Energy Program by structuring it with the backing of a coalition that they consistently referred to as “industry, science, and the administration.” In the media campaign and in additional speeches, Schmidt, Matthöfer, and other ministers also increasingly began referring to anti-nuclear arguments as being rooted in opinions, emotions, and lawless violence, while their program was rooted in expertise, facts, and the rule of law.

Despite these extensive efforts, the anti-nuclear movement was actively responding to the rhetoric of pro-nuclear advocates. In addressing Schmidt and other ministers who referred to the 1930s and economic crash as a reason for building nuclear energy, anti-nuclear advocates began weaponizing the memory of the Third Reich and referring to pro-nuclear advocates as “nuclear fascists.” Nevertheless, after closing 1976 with his speech in front of the Bundestag, Schmidt remained committed to his program which he argued was rooted in “science” and “necessity” and supported the continued construction at the Brokdorf nuclear reactor in February 1977. In doing so, Schmidt set stage was set for one of the largest demonstrations in West German history and further clashing over the future of nuclear energy in West Germany.

1. HSA: EA111: “Ansprache von Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt”, (VDI Nachrichten) - (4.7.1975) Page 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. BArch, 136, 25613, “Moglichkeiten der weiteren Entwicklung der Kernenergie”, page 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. BArch, 136, 25613, “Handelsblatt Duesseldorf”, March 17, 1975, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. BArch, 136, 25613, “Informationen: der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag”, March 14, 1975, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. BArch, 136, 25613, “FDK Tagesdiesnt: Pressedienst der Bundestagsfraktion der F.D.P.”, March 14, 1975, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. BArch, 136, 10869, “Auszuge aus der Aufzeichnung ueber die Besprechung des Bundeskanzlers  mit den Reigerunschefs der Laender am 24. April 1975.”, April 24,1975, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. BKHS, Helmut Schmidt,“Ansprache von Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt” *Verein Deutscher Ingenieure* Nachrichten), HSA EA111, July 4, 1975, 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid., 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid., 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Stephen G Gross,. *Energy and Power: Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. BArch, 102, 194415, “Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen MBH.“ 1. *Note: The 12 companies included Badenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, Karlsruhe, Bayemwerk Aktiengesellschaft, Munich, Elektromark, Kornmmales Elektrizitatswerk Mark Aktiengesellscbaft, Hagen, Energie-Versorgung Schwaben Aktiengesellschaft, Stuttgart, Hamburgische Electricitaets-Werke, Hamburg, Isar-Amperwerke Aktiengesellschaft, Munich, Neckarwerke Elektrizitatsversorgungs-Aktiengesellschaft, Esslingen, Nordwestdeutsche Kraftwerke Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg, Preußische Elektrizitaets-Aktiengesellschaft, Hanover, Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk Aktiengesellschaft, Essen, Technische Werke der Stadt Stuttgart Aktiengesellschaft, Stuttgart, Vereinigte Elektrizitatswerke Westfalen Aktiengesellschaft, Dortmund* [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. BArch 136, 10868, Werner Maihofer, “Bundestag - friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.”, July 16, 1976, 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Ibid., 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Ibid., 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Ibid., 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid., 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. BArch, 136, 10903 "Aufklärung der Bevölkerung über die Notwendigkeit des Baus von Kernkraftwerken.”, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Ibid., 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. BArch, 145, 14499, “Buergerdialog Kernenergie im 1. Halbjahr 1976” 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. BArch, 136, 10903 “Die Toleranzen der Bundesbevölkerung gegenuber dem Bau von kernkraftwerken - January/February 1976”, 460. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Ibid., 465. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Ibid., 470. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. BArch, 145, 14499 “Buergerdialog Kernenergie im 1. Halbjahr 1976”, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Hans Matthöfer. *Interviews und Gespräche zur Kernenergie: Den unsterblichen Tiger am Schwanz gepackt*. Karlsruhe: C.F. Müller, 1976. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Ibid., 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Ibid., 92. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Ibid., 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Ibid., 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. BArch, 145, 14499 “Buergerdialog Kernenergie im 1. Halbjahr 1976”, July 6, 1976, 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Barch, 145, 14499 “Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe Informationsaktion Kernenergie & Information der Bundesregierung zur friedlichen Nutzung der Kernenergie”, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Ibid., 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Ibid., 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Ibid., 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Ibid., 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. BArch, 136, 10868 “Kernkraftwerk Brokdorf - Stellungnahme zu Standort”, 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. BArch, 136, 10868, “Brokdorf Bericht und Anfrage des Herrn Bundespräsidenten an atomlichen Genehmigungsverfahren.”, 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Ibid., 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Christian Schütze, “Kernkraft spaltet den Rechtsstaat” [“Nuclear Power Splits the Constitutional State”], *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, November 3, 1976. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. BArch, 136, 10869, Helmut Schmidt, “Regierunseklaerung des Bundeskanzlers vor dem Deutschen Bundestag”, December 17,1976, 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Ibid., 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)