

Religious Discrimination in Christian-Majority Democracies from 1990 to 2014

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Abstract: This study examines patterns in societal and government-based religious discrimination (SRD and GRD) against 307 religious minorities in 67 Christian-majority democracies using the Religion and State-Minorities round 3 (RASM3) dataset. Despite expectations that all forms of religious discrimination, especially GRD, should be lower in Western liberal democracies, it is, in fact, lower in developing countries. I argue that three factors explain this discrepancy. Economically developed countries have more resources available for discrimination. Western democracies have higher levels of support for religion than Christian-majority developing countries and countries which more strongly support religion are more likely to discriminate against religious minorities. Finally levels of SRD are higher in the West and SRD is posited to be a cause of GRD. Empirical tests support these propositions.

This study examines patterns of religious discrimination against 307 religious minorities in 67 Christian-majority democracies using the Religion and State-Minorities round 3 (RASM3) dataset.¹ Specifically, I look at two types of discrimination included in RASM3. First, government-based religious discrimination (GRD) is defined as restrictions placed on the religious practices or institutions of minority religions by governments. (Fox, 2015; 2016) Second, societal religious discrimination (SRD) is defined as actions taken against minority religions by members of society who do not directly represent the government.

While theories on religious freedom in liberal democracies predict that religious discrimination, especially GRD, should be lower in Western democracies, empirical evidence from this study as well as previous studies (Fox, 2008; 2015; 2016) shows that this is not the case and GRD is lower in developing countries. I posit that three factors can help to explain this discrepancy: economic development, government support for religion and SRD. The empirical evidence I present in this study supports this argument. That being said, the empirical evidence also shows that GRD is common across all Christian democracies and SRD is also common but less common than GRD.

This study proceeds and follows. First, I examine the assumption of religious freedom in liberal democracies. Second, I discuss the reasons I predict that economic

¹ For a discussion of how the term democracy is operationally defined see this study's data description and analysis section.

development, government support for religion and SRD are all potential causes of GRD. Third, I use the Religion and State-Minorities round 3 (RASM3) dataset to test these hypotheses.

The Assumption of Religious Freedom in Western Liberal Democracies

There are two general assumptions in the literature that I address here. First, that liberal democracies hold religious freedom as a core value and in practice maintain religious freedom for all of their citizens, including religious minorities. The second, is that the countries in the “West” are liberal democracies and are the strongest supporters of religious freedom.

This religious freedom is believed to exist within the larger context of a value of governments maintaining some level of separation of religion and state. Of course, there are different partially overlapping standards of what religious freedom and separation of religion and state mean. These can include: (1) at a bare minimum maintaining the free exercise of religion, (2) avoiding the persecution of religious minorities in areas other than religion such as economic and political rights, (3) maintaining neutrality with regard to religion, that is treating all religions equally including in matters of support for religion, (4) governments avoiding interfering in religion in any way whether to support it or restrict it, and (5) maintaining a secular public space but preserving religious freedom in the private sphere. (Fox, 2016: 12-26) While there is no agreement on which of these conceptions, or which mix of these conceptions, is the proper one for liberal democracies, restricting the religious practices or institutions of a minority religion in a manner that the government does not restrict the majority religion—the definition of GRD used in this study—violates all of these conceptions.

There are several reasons for these linked assumptions of religious freedom in liberal and especially Western democracies. Some of these explanations focus on how Christianity influences religious tolerance. Martin (1978: 25-49), for example, links the rise of Protestantism to increased tolerance for four reasons. First, the Protestant reformation created religious pluralism in the West which, in turn, increased religious tolerance. Second, Protestant denominations were less often symbiotically connected to the state. Third, Protestantism focuses more on individualism. As a result, Protestants are less likely to consider the Church superior to the state. Finally, the doctrine of election present in some Protestant theologies evolved into free grace which in turn led to support for universal rights. Woodbury & Shaw (2012) similarly argue that Protestantism promotes pluralism, an independent civil society, economic development, reduced corruption, mass education and religion’s independence from the state, all important foundations for democracy.

Others focus their arguments on evolving Catholic ideology. Philpott (2007) and Anderson (2007) argue that Vatican II (1962-1965) resulted in three relevant changes in the Catholic Church. It has become more tolerant of religious minorities, more supportive of democracy, and more explicitly and actively supportive of human rights, as well as economic and social justice. Also, the Church became less entrenched in local politics, leaving more room for democracy.

Others focus more generally on Western culture and ideals which, they argue, support religion freedom, sometimes in the context of the West’s secular nature. For instance, Calhoun (2012: 86) argues that “the tacit understanding of citizenship in the

modern West has been secular. This is so despite the existence of state churches, presidents who pray, and a profound role for religious motivations in major public movements.” Cesari, (2014: 1) similarly argues that “drawing on the historical experience of Western countries, an academic consensus has emerged that modernization, democratization, and secularization are inextricably linked in any process of political development.” There is no shortage of examples of this consensus. Appleby (2000: 2) argues that “the core values of secularized Western societies, including freedom of speech and freedom of religion, were elaborated in outraged response to inquisitions, crusades, pogroms, and wars conducted in the name of God.” Huntington, (1996: 75) argues that this is unique to the West. “The separation and recurring clashes between the church and state that typify Western civilization have existed in no other civilization. The division of authority contributed immeasurably to the development of freedom in the West.” Demerath & Straight (1997: 47) similarly argue that “there is no question that the secular-state secular-politics combination is often associated with Western Europe in particular.” Beit-Hallahmi (2003: 11) takes this perhaps to its extreme when he argues that “whenever, and wherever, religion in the West manifests itself in a form which is more than a matter of private faith, it will be defined in most Western societies as disruptive and judged to be marginal and deviant.

A third theme in the literature contrasts between the secular West and the less secular developing world, particularly Islam. Facchini’s (2010) article which is titled “Religion, Law and Development: Islam and Christianity—Why is it in Occident and not in the Orient that Man Invented the Institutions of Religious Freedom?” is a clear example, but there are many others. Cesari (2014) argues that modernization led to religious freedom in the West but not the Muslim world.

The modernization of Muslim societies, unlike Western ones, did not lead to the privatization of religion but to the opposite, that is, the politicization of Islam in a way unprecedented in premodern Muslim societies. This is not because Islam does not separate religion and politics (which is by the way historically false) but because the Islamic tradition was integrated into the nation state-building that took place at the end of the Ottoman Empire (Cesari, 2014: xiii)

Hurd (2007: 349) argues similarly that a “policy consequence of Euro-American secularist epistemology is that the forms and degrees of separation between public and private, sacred and secular, Islam and politics that do exist in contemporary Muslim-majority societies either do not appear at all, or appear as ill-fitting imitations of a Western secular ideal.”

Haynes (1997: 709) focuses more generally on the developing world. “Secularization continues in much of the industrialized West but not in many parts of the Third World.” Imboden (2013: 164) similarly contrasts the West and non-West. “The post-Enlightenment tradition in the West of treating religion as an exclusively private and personal matter sometimes prevents policymakers from perceiving the public and corporate nature of religion in many non-Western societies.”

While much of those discussed so far contrast Western secularization to non-Western religiousness, a fourth theme focuses more specifically on secularization

theory—the prediction that modernity will reduce the influence of religion in government and society.² This argument was more influential in the past but some supporters still remain. (Fox, 2015) The specific formulation of this type of claim varies, but their common denominator is the argument that a part of the world variously described as the West, Europe, or specific parts of Europe is secularizing. This implicitly includes a decline of religious discrimination.

Berger (1996/1997; 2009), for example, argues that Western and Central Europe and certain intellectual circles are the exception to a world where religion is resurging. Marquand & Nettle (2000: 2) similarly argue that "Western Europe appears to be an exception ... Organized religion almost certainly plays a smaller role in politics in 2000 over most of the territory of the European Union than it did in 1950." Some explicitly contrast the West's secularization to the centrality of religion in politics in the Muslim world. (eg. Hefner, 2001: 492-493; Tibi, 2000) Others who support secularization theory, explicitly limit their arguments to the West, implicitly contrasting it to the non-West. (Bruce, 2002; 2009; Halman & Draulans, 2006; Kaspersen & Lindvall, 2008; Voicu, 2009)

A fifth type of argument focuses on specific political and social processes unique to the West and argues they are the reason for secularization and, implicitly, increased religious freedom. Haynes (1997; 1998; 2009) focuses on how Western governments have co-opted and subordinated religious institutions as well as instituting equality policies. Crouch (2000) argues that that the rejection of religion in politics due to past religious wars as well as increased individualism and liberalism among Europeans is reducing the demand for restrictive collective identities. This has reduced European Churches' political influence. In addition, increased adherence to the ideals of liberalism in Europe has forced its churches to focus more on tolerance. In fact, Kuhle (2011) explicitly argues that in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland the governments have forced their national (Lutheran) churches to take more liberal stances on a wide variety of issues including gay marriage and the ordination of women. In this case the reason is that the close relationship between religion and state in these countries has given the government sufficient leverage over these choices to alter their ideologies and theologies on significant issues.

Taylor (2007) argues the opposite. He posits that religion no longer legitimizes the state in the West because the West has shifted from "a society where belief in God is unchallenged...to one in which it is understood to be one option among others." (Taylor, 2007: 3) Norris & Inglehart (2004) argue that the key process is economic. In developed countries, including the West, increased existential security is reducing religion's influence. Specifically, when one no longer need worry about basic issues like food, shelter, and safety, the need for religion decreases.

Based on all of the above we would expect religious GRD in the West to be low and declining and that the West has disproportionately low levels of religious GRD compared to other Christian-majority democracies. As I show in the empirical portion of this study, this is not the case.

Why Would We Expect Less GRD in the Developing World?

² For a review and discussion of the theory see Fox (2015) and Gorski & **Error! Main Document Only.**Altinordu (2008).

Previous studies of GRD have found that among Christian-majority countries GRD is lower in developing countries than in Western democracies and the former Soviet bloc. (Fox, 2008; 2016) However these studies examine this issue as part of a larger focus on GRD worldwide and devote limited attention to why GRD is lower in the developing world. In addition, they examine the Christian world in its entirety and do not focus on democracies.

Despite these studies identify two factors that may help account for why GRD is lower among Christian states in the developing world. The first is economic development. Fox (2008; 2015; 2016) finds consistently that more developed countries, as measured by per-capita GDP engage in higher levels of GRD. However, there is little discussion of why this might be the case.

One potential explanation is that GRD takes resources and resources are scarcer in less developed countries. Gill (2008) makes this argument in his discussion of the causes of religious liberty. His focus is on rational choice explanations for why politicians choose to support religious freedom policies. He argues that supporting a religious monopoly has costs but these costs are worth it because if the supported religion gives the government legitimacy and teaches the population to be moral this lowers the costs for law enforcement and repression. Supporting a religious monopoly can also involve repressing religious minorities. In fact many argue that without repressing minority religions, religious monopolies are not possible. (Casanova, 2009; Froese, 2004: 36; Gill, 2008: 45; Grim & Finke, 2011:70; Stark & Finke, 2000: 199) This can be described in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: States with lower levels of economic development will engage in less GRD.

Interestingly the influence of economic development is posited by Finke (2013) to have the opposite effect on SRD. Protecting religious freedom from limitations placed on it by societal actors can cost resources. Finke (2013: 301-302) argues that “like other freedoms, protecting religious freedoms can be both inconvenient and costly. Even when the state lacks explicit motives for restricting religious freedoms, the state often allows restrictions to arise because it lacks either the motive or the ability to protect such freedoms.” This is because “when the state is weak...the tyranny of the majority and the actions of religious, political, and social movements can quickly deny the religious freedoms of others.” (Finke, 2013: 303) To the extent these societal actors can influence the government it might also lead to higher levels of GRD.

The second explanation is support for religion. Previous studies show that, on average, developing Christian-majority countries engage in less support for religion. This is likely because support also requires resources. (Fox, 2008; 2015) If this finding also holds for Christian-majority democracies in the developing world it can provide an explanation for lower levels of GRD. This is because when states are linked to a religion, the likelihood of GRD increased dramatically. (Fox, 2008; 2015; Grim & Finke, 2011: 70) As noted above, this can be a political calculation based on state support for a religious monopoly. It can also be a result of theological, doctrinal, or ideological motivations. Stark (2001; 2003) argues that Christianity, as one of the Abrahamic religions, is particularly intolerant of competition. Wald (1987: 267-267) similarly argues that Christianity can be particularly intolerant when it creates ultimate values which can

inhibit the ability to compromise or accommodate others. This is especially true when a religion believes there is only one path to salvation. (Stark, 2001; 2003) or when beliefs are based on an exclusive divine revelation. (Wilcox, 1990). This can be described in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: States which more strongly support a religion will engage in higher levels of GRD.

A third potential explanation for variances across as well as within states in GRD is SRD. Grim & Finke (2011) demonstrate that SRD and prejudices are a precursor to GRD. They argue that societal prejudices can influence government repression through a variety of avenues including the attitudes of politicians, religious pressure groups, religious political parties, and the simple fact that repressing a minority may be popular. If levels of SRD are lower in developing countries than in Western democracies this could at least partially explain the lower levels of GRD in these countries. This can be described by the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Religious minorities which experience higher levels of SRD will also experience higher levels of GRD.

While Grim & Finke's (2011) data was collected at the country-level, the data RASM3 used in this study was collected separately for each religious minority so this study can test this hypothesis based on the links between societal and GRD against specific minorities. This focus on specific minorities is important because attitudes toward minorities can have deep historical and cultural roots. For example, Kaplan & Small (2006) demonstrate that anti-Semitism in a region in the past can predict current anti-Semitism.

Data Description and Analysis

This analysis uses the Religion and State-Minorities round 3 (RASM3) dataset which has added features to those of previous rounds (Fox, 2008; 2015; 2016) which enable this study. While RASM2 includes minority-specific data on government-based discrimination (GRD), RASM3 adds new data on societal discrimination (SRD). This study focuses on the data from 1990 and 2014, the earliest and most recent data currently available, for 307 religious minorities in 67 Christian-majority democracies. These democracies were selected by including all Christian-majority countries whose score on the Polity index³ was 8 or higher. Countries with no polity score were included if they were determined to be "free" by the Freedom House democracy index.⁴

As with previous rounds, to collect RASM3, each country was examined using multiple sources including primary sources such as laws and constitutions, media reports, government reports, NGO reports, and academic sources. These reports provided the basis for coding the variables.

Minorities which meet a population threshold of at least 0.25% in a country were included in the study. Smaller Jewish and Muslim minorities were included due to their

³ <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>

⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018>

prominence in current World politics. Minorities are divided into the following categories: Christian (e.g., Protestants in a Catholic-majority country), Muslims, Jews, and other. While the “other” category includes diverse minorities including Hindus, Buddhists, Animists, Sikhs, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Rastafarians, Baha’i, Scientologists, Animists, and Chinese religions, there are not a sufficient number of any of these groups to form a category large enough for meaningful statistical analysis.

In the analysis I categorize countries based on world region into 26 Western democracies, 15 former Soviet bloc states, and 26 in the developing world (Asia, Africa, and Latin America). I also divide states along denominational lines into Catholic, Orthodox, and other types of Christianity, though some world regions do not include states in all of these categories.

RASM3 uses similar procedures for constructing both SRD and GRD. Both are additive indexes and the components within the indexes were coded on a scale of 0 to 2. The 27 types of SRD were each coded as follows:

- 0 = There are no reported incidents of this type of action against the specified minority.
- 1 = This action occurs on a minor level.
- 2 = This action occurs on a substantial level.

These 27 types of SRD include acts of economic discrimination, speech acts against minorities such as anti-minority propaganda by clergy, the media or political party campaigns, acts against property such as vandalism and graffiti, non-violent harassment and violent acts against the minority. The codes for the 35 types of GRD are:

- 0 = The activity is not significantly restricted or the government does not engage in this practice.
- 1 = The activity is slightly restricted or the government engages in a mild form of this practice.
- 2 = The activity is significantly restricted or the government engages in a severe form of this practice.

These types of GRD include restrictions on the religious practices, institutions, clergy, and proselytizing by the minority. The resulting variables range from 0 to 70 for GRD and 0 to 54 for SRD. However, none of the minorities in this study reach the highest levels of either measure.⁵

Before explaining *why* there is a difference between GRD among Christian-majority democracies, it is important to establish *whether* such differences exist. Table 1 examines mean levels of GRD. The results show that overall, GRD is lower in developing countries with statistical significance but this result has several nuances. First, it is highest in the former Soviet bloc. Second there is considerable variation in GRD within each region based on majority Christian denomination. In both Western democracies and the former Soviet bloc Orthodox-majority states engage in higher mean levels of GRD, though in Western democracies this is based only on two countries, Greece and Cyprus.

⁵ For a more detailed discussion of sources, data collection procedures, a reliability analysis and a discussion of why RAS composite measures are additive rather than weighted see Fox (2008; 2015).

In non-Orthodox-majority Western democracies Catholic-majority states engage in higher levels of GRD than do other states. However, in developing countries, the “other” states engage in less GRD than Catholic-majority states. In fact, the differences between Catholic-majority states in Western democracies and the developing world are relatively small so the large difference between the developing world and Western democracies among Christian majority democracies is largely driven by the differences between those regions’ non-Catholic non-Orthodox-majority states.

[Table 1 about here]

Third, as found by Fox (2016), GRD varies across religious minorities but this variation is different across groupings of states. In the West and in non-Orthodox-majority former Soviet states Muslims experience the highest levels of religious discrimination. Orthodox-majority states, both in the West and in the former Soviet bloc discriminate most against Christian minorities, many of them US-based Protestant denominations. Catholic-majority states in the developing world also discriminate most against Christian minorities.

Finally, also confirming Fox (2016) nearly all of these states discriminate against at least one minority and those that do discriminate do so against some minorities more than others. Only Barbados, Canada, Lesotho, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, Uruguay, and Vanuatu do not discriminate.⁶ Among these states, only Canada is Western and only the Philippines and Uruguay are Catholic-majority. Only Cape Verde, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Luxembourg, Peru, and Portugal, engage in discrimination but do so at the same level to all minorities. Thus, 52 of 67 (77.6%) of these states engage in unequal levels of GRD against their religious minorities.

Table 2 examines levels of government support for religion in order to determine whether this varies between world regions. This table, which uses the country rather than the minority as the level of analysis because it is measuring government religion policy, looks at two aspects of support. First, RAS3 divides official government religion policies into 14 canaigres which I simplify into five:

- The State has an official religion
- While there is no official religion, the state in practice supports one religion more than others
- While there is no official religion, the state in practice supports multiple religions more than others
- The state treats all religions equally and has a positive or neutral attitude toward religion
- The state is at least slightly hostile to religion.

RAS3 also includes a composite variable of 52 ways a state might specifically support religion including passing religious laws as state laws, financing religion, and entanglement between religious and government intuitions, among others. Table 2

⁶ Trinidad and Tobago does not discriminate against any minority listed in RASM but engage in minor restrictions on foreign missionaries.

included mean levels of this variable for each of the above categories as well as in general.

[Table 2 about here]

The patterns of official religion policy and support for religion clearly differ across world regions. Western democracies are the most likely to have an official religion and in 2014, 53.1% either officially or unofficially supported one religion more than others. In contrast, in 2014 among developing countries, only Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic had official religions. In the former Soviet bloc, no country has an official religion but a bit over half support one religion more than others. Mean levels of support for religion are lower in developing countries both in general and at each level of official religion policy. Thus, it is possible that variations in levels of support for religion may explain the lower levels of GRD in developing countries.

Table 3 examines levels of SRD in order to determine whether it varies across world regions. Overall SRD is significantly lower in developing countries than in Western democracies and former Soviet states. However, there are some exceptions when looking at specific types of minorities. Christian minorities in the West experience less SRD than do Christian minorities in the developing world but levels are low for both regions. Also, while former Soviet “other” groups have lower levels of SRD than do minorities in the same category in the developing world, this is based on a sample of one, the Spiritists in Poland.

[Table 3 about here]

Overall the patterns of SRD show that while less common than GRD, it is present in a majority of countries in all categories of states examined here against at least one religious minority. However, then looking at the proportion of minorities influenced, a regional disparity emerges. 41.7% and 44.3% of minorities in Western democracies and the former Soviet bloc, respectively, experience at least one type of SRD and opposed to 22.1% in the developing world. Given all of this and the theorized connection between SRD and GRD, it is possible that SRD can provide an explanation for the lower levels of GRD in developing countries.

Tables 4a and 4b use OLS regressions to examine the potential correlates of SRD and GRD in 1990 and 2014. In addition to support for religion, SRD (in the tests for GRD), and dummy variables for (1) world region, (2) the majority Christian denomination, and (3) the minority religion, these tests include several control variables found by Fox (2016) to predict GRD. Log-per-capita GDP⁷ is included for this reason as well as because hypothesis 1 predicts less GRD in less developed countries. Since all of these countries are democracies, there is no control for regime but regime duration is measured by the number of years since the last change in the Polity index.⁸ The tests also control for the country’s population size which can be theorized to either increase or decrease GRD⁹. (Fox, 2016) Finally, as violence by a minority religion might provoke a

⁷ Taken for the World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/>.

⁸ <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>

⁹ Taken for the World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/>.

discriminatory reaction, I include a variable from RASM3 which measures societal actions taken by a minority against the majority. This variable measures five types of actions including violence, terror, harassment, vandalism, and other actions each measured on a scale of 0 to 2 for each year between 1990 and 2014. As these actions must precede the discrimination to have the predicted effect, I use this variable only for the tests predicting SRD and GRD in 2014. The variable measures the averages for 1990 to 2014.

[tables 4a and 4b about here]

The results provide robust evidence supporting all three hypotheses which are designed to predict GRD but not SRD. Given this, it is interesting that log-per-capita GDP (hypothesis 1) and support for religion (hypothesis 2) are not associated with SRD at the .05 level of significance though in two of the models per-capita GDP is associated with SRD at the .1 level. The only statistically significant predictors of SRD are the country's population size and the identity of the religious minority. This establishes that SRD is mostly independent of these factors and that any influence it has on GRD is also independent of these factors.

All four models predicting GRD show that per-capita GDP (hypothesis 1), support for religion (hypothesis 2), and SRD (hypothesis 3) predict GRD at high levels of significance. Even more interesting, in table 4b, when these factors as well as the controls, are taken into account developing countries are significantly associated with more GRD and Western democracies are associated with lower levels.

Some of the results for the control variables are consistent with the bivariate analysis. Orthodox-majority countries engage in higher levels of GRD. Jews experience higher levels of SRD but lower levels of GRD.

Conclusions

Both government-based religious discrimination (GRD) and societal religious discrimination (SRD), are ubiquitous even in Christian-majority democracies and even in the Western democracies whose liberal values include religious freedom. Yet it varies across world region, a country's majority Christian denomination, and the minority religion. This study finds that among Christian-majority democracies, despite expectations of religious freedom particularly in Western liberal democracies, the developing world has lower levels of GRD, particularly in non-Catholic-majority developing states.

I find that this can be explained by three factors which all prove to be statistically significant. First, less developed states have fewer resources to invest in GRD. Second, state support for religion, which is stronger in Western democracies, is associated with higher levels of GRD. This, I posit is because when states are more strongly associated with a religion there are ideological motivations to discriminate as well as a tendency for the dominant religion to pressure the government to preserve its religious monopoly. (Fox, 2015; Gill, 2008) Third, Grim & Finke (2011), among others, argue that SRD leads to GRD. I find that SRD is lower in developing countries and a strong predictor of GRD. Once all of this is taken into account developing countries are statistically associated with higher levels of GRD and Western democracies are associated with lower levels.

Thus predictions of religious freedom in Western democracies are both accurate and inaccurate depending on one's perspective. On one hand when controlling for a number of variables the predicted association exists. However, and I posit more importantly, in absolute terms, religious discrimination both SRD and GRD are common and, on average, higher in Western democracies than in the developing world. While this can be explained by other factors, these factors themselves undermine the assumptions of religious freedom and separation of religion and state in the West. The strong support for religion in the West certainly undermines assumptions of separation of religion and state. Finke (2013) would also argue that it undermines the concept of a level playing field for all religions. That is, when a state supports one religion but not others, that puts the non-supported religions at a disadvantage when competing for members which can have an effect similar to discrimination. The presence of SRD against at least one minority in most Western countries undermines assumptions that the values of religious freedom are shared by all of their citizens. Finally, the finding that the wealth of the West facilitates the ability of its governments to engage in GRD is certainly inconsistent with assumptions of religious freedom in the West in general and Norris and Inglehart's (2004) arguments that economic security results in a decline in the importance of religion. Given this, we need to question either whether religious freedom is truly an integral element of liberal democracy or whether those countries we consider liberal democracies truly meet this standard.

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Table 1: Government-Based Discrimination against Religious Minorities in 1990* and 2014

| Region and majority religion | Mean levels of discrimination | | | | | | | | | | | | % of Countries which discriminate against at least one minority | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------|-------|--------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------------------|-------|--------|--------|---|------|
| | All Cases | | | | Christian | | | | Minority religion | | | | | |
| | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 |
| Western Democracies | 2.42 | 2.95c | 2.16 | 2.42b | 3.65 | 5.38c | 2.42 | 2.63 | 1.70 | 1.79 | 88.5% | 96.2% | | |
| Catholic | 1.82 | 2.02 | 1.27 | 1.40 | 2.64 | 3.55 | 1.36 | 1.18 | 2.38 | 2.25 | 80.9% | 100.0% | | |
| Orthodox (2 countries) | 9.80 | 11.00a | 12.00 | 14.00 | 10.00 | 11.50 | 8.50 | 9.00 | na | na | 100.0% | 100.0% | | |
| Other Christian | 2.27 | 2.96c | 2.40 | 2.67a | 3.54 | 6.00c | 2.38 | 2.85 | 1.48 | 1.64a | 84.6% | 92.3% | | |
| Former Soviet Orthodox | 4.39f | 5.13af | 4.90e | 5.87af | 5.20 | 5.93 | 2.80 | 3.07 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 86.7% | 100.0% | | |
| Non-Orthodox | 6.00d | 7.31bf | 6.64d | 8.36be | 6.83 | 7.50 | 3.67 | 4.67a | na | na | 100.0% | 100.0% | | |
| Developing Countries | 3.20d | 3.51f | 3.37d | 3.68e | 4.11 | 4.89 | 2.22 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 77.8% | 100.0% | | |
| Catholic | 1.73f | 1.66f | 2.24 | 1.97e | 1.26f | 1.57f | 2.25 | 2.08 | 1.54 | 1.46 | 65.4% | 76.9% | | |
| Other Christian | 2.45f | 2.22f | 3.13f | 2.74f | 1.67 | 1.93 | 3.00a | 2.56 | 2.23f | 1.98e | 76.5% | 88.2% | | |
| All Cases | 0.32f | 0.55f | 0.20f | 0.20f | 0.50 | 1.13 | 0.00a | 0.67 | 0.35f | 0.57e | 44.4% | 55.6% | | |
| All Cases | 3.49 | 3.68c | 3.06 | 3.36 | 4.19 | 4.57c | 2.49 | 2.62 | 1.59 | 1.58 | 79.1% | 89.6% | | |

*1990 or the earliest year available

a = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .05

b = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .01

c = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .001

d = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05

e = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05

f = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05

(For Western democracies we compared only Catholic and other non-Orthodox-majority states)

Table 2: Official Government Policy and Levels of Support for Religion in 1990* and 2014

| Official religion policy | % of countries having specified official religion policy | | | | | | Mean levels of support for religion | | | | | |
|---|--|-------|---------------|-------|----------------------|-------|-------------------------------------|-------|---------------|--------|----------------------|-------|
| | Western democracies | | Former Soviet | | Developing Countries | | Western democracies | | Former Soviet | | Developing Countries | |
| | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 |
| Official religion | 34.6% | 30.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 15.4% | 7.7% | 12.77 | 12.25 | na | na | 7.50 | 7.50 |
| One religion preferred over others | 23.1% | 23.1% | 40.0% | 53.3% | 34.6% | 26.9% | 8.83 | 8.67 | 7.33 | 10.13 | 6.00 | 6.91 |
| Several religions preferred over others | 15.4% | 23.1% | 53.3% | 46.7% | 15.4% | 15.4% | 8.50 | 8.83 | 8.00 | 10.14 | 6.25 | 7.50 |
| Positive neutrality | 23.1% | 19.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 26.9% | 26.9% | 5.50 | 6.40 | na | na | 5.86 | 5.86 |
| Hostility | 3.8% | 3.8% | 6.7% | 0.0% | 7.7% | 7.7% | 6.00 | 6.00 | 3.00 | na | 2.00 | 3.00 |
| All cases | | | | | | | 9.27b | 9.27 | 7.40 | 10.13a | 5.92c | 6.46c |

*1990 or the earliest year available

a = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions < .05

b = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions < .01

c = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions < .001

Table 3: Societal Discrimination against Religious minorities, 1990* and 2014

| Region and majority religion | Mean levels of discrimination | | | | | | | | | | | | % of Countries which discriminate against at least one minority | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|-------|--------|-------------------|------|--------|--------|---|------|
| | All Cases | | | | Christian | | | | Minority religion | | | | | |
| | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 | 1990* | 2014 |
| Western Democracies | 2.03 | 3.70cf | 0.16d | 0.13c | 2.88d | 6.80cf | 5.15 | 8.46cd | 0.64 | 0.85 | 69.2% | 88.5% | | |
| Catholic | 1.27 | 2.96 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.90 | 4.36bd | 2.82 | 7.00a | 0.62 | 1.00 | 45.5% | 72.7% | | |
| Orthodox (2 countries) | 5.80 | 7.60 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 6.50 | 9.00 | 7.50 | 9.50 | na | na | 100.0% | 100.0% | | |
| Other Christian | 2.26 | 3.91c | 0.27 | 0.20 | 3.15 | 8.55cd | 6.77 | 9.54b | 0.64 | 0.80 | 84.6% | 84.6% | | |
| Former Soviet | 3.26d | 3.11 | 3.00d | 2.53d | 1.87 | 1.87 | 5.40 | 5.53 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 93.3% | 93.3% | | |
| Orthodox | 3.23 | 3.62 | 3.64 | 4.00 | 1.67 | 2.50 | 3.83 | 3.83 | na | na | 83.3% | 83.3% | | |
| Non-Orthodox | 3.28 | 2.74 | 2.44 | 1.44 | 2.00 | 1.44 | 6.44 | 6.67 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 88.9% | 88.9% | | |
| Developing Countries | 0.58f | 0.77af | 0.60 | 0.79 | 0.43f | 0.70f | 2.41 | 3.17a | 0.29 | 0.33 | 65.4% | 65.4% | | |
| Catholic | 0.69 | 0.91a | 0.87 | 1.13 | 0.47 | 0.47 | 2.67 | 3.56 | 0.23 | 0.35 | 60.6% | 64.7% | | |
| Other Christian | 0.39 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 1.13a | 1.67 | 2.00 | 0.39 | 0.30 | 55.6% | 66.7% | | |
| All Cases | 1.66 | 2.34c | 1.22 | 1.16 | 1.77 | 3.45c | 4.60 | 6.43c | 0.40 | 0.50 | 73.1% | 84.1% | | |

*1990 or the earliest year available

a = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .05

b = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .01

c = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .001

d = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05

e = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05

f = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05

(For Western democracies we compared only Catholic and other non-Orthodox-majority states)

Table 4a: OLS Regressions Predicting SRD and GRD

| | Societal discrimination (SRD) | | | | Government-based discrimination (GRD) | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|------|-------|------|---------------------------------------|------|-------|------|
| | 1990* | | 2014 | | 1990* | | 2014 | |
| | Beta | Sig | Beta | Sig | Beta | Sig | Beta | Sig |
| Western Democracy | -.074 | .538 | .047 | .679 | -.338 | .001 | -.176 | .071 |
| Former Soviet | .124 | .093 | .144 | .078 | -.091 | .153 | -.153 | .030 |
| Majority Catholic | -.055 | .393 | -.076 | .254 | .205 | .000 | .029 | .617 |
| Majority Orthodox | .064 | .372 | .051 | .488 | .465 | .000 | .504 | .000 |
| Minority Christian | .000 | .997 | .010 | .882 | .044 | .449 | .056 | .334 |
| Minority Muslim | .086 | .164 | .065 | .309 | .051 | .339 | .129 | .019 |
| Minority Jewish | .336 | .000 | .339 | .000 | -.145 | .010 | -.138 | .014 |
| Log-Country population | .264 | .000 | .238 | .000 | .082 | .087 | .062 | .207 |
| Log-Per Capita GDP (h1) | .188 | .081 | .079 | .449 | .234 | .012 | .255 | .005 |
| Regime Duration | -.083 | .274 | -.098 | .253 | .020 | .756 | -.100 | .175 |
| Support for Religion (h2) | .029 | .612 | .020 | .743 | .415 | .000 | .313 | .000 |
| Minority population % | .065 | .244 | .037 | .519 | -.075 | .122 | -.071 | .147 |
| Minority violence (1990-2014) | -- | -- | .078 | .156 | -- | -- | .016 | .730 |
| Societal discrimination (h3) | -- | -- | -- | -- | .299 | .000 | .242 | .000 |
| df | 307 | | 307 | | 307 | | 307 | |
| Adjusted r-squared | .203 | | .197 | | .408 | | .407 | |

Table 4b: OLS Regressions Predicting SRD and GRD

| | Societal discrimination (SRD) | | | | Government-based discrimination (GRD) | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|------|-------|------|---------------------------------------|------|-------|------|
| | 1990* | | 2014 | | 1990* | | 2014 | |
| | Beta | Sig | Beta | Sig | Beta | Sig | Beta | Sig |
| Developing world | -.101 | .251 | -.070 | .415 | .167 | .029 | .175 | .030 |
| Majority Catholic | -.059 | .363 | -.095 | .116 | .201 | .000 | .035 | .535 |
| Majority Orthodox | .081 | .254 | .076 | .249 | .481 | .000 | .495 | .000 |
| Minority Christian | .025 | .702 | .004 | .953 | .069 | .226 | .056 | .330 |
| Minority Muslim | .094 | .127 | .226 | .000 | .058 | .277 | .098 | .071 |
| Minority Jewish | .349 | .000 | .448 | .000 | -.136 | .016 | -.176 | .003 |
| Log-Country population | .248 | .000 | .298 | .000 | .063 | .188 | .046 | .355 |
| Log-Per Capita GDP (h1) | .054 | .529 | .149 | .090 | .097 | .188 | .217 | .009 |
| Regime Duration | -.106 | .164 | -.082 | .271 | -.001 | .992 | -.106 | .134 |
| Support for Religion (h2) | -.001 | .986 | .001 | .984 | .384 | .000 | .322 | .000 |
| Minority population % | .054 | .332 | .066 | .230 | -.087 | .074 | -.054 | .292 |
| Minority violence (1990-2014) | -- | -- | .004 | .930 | -- | -- | -.052 | .275 |
| Societal discrimination (h3) | -- | -- | -- | -- | .313 | .000 | .278 | .000 |
| df | 307 | | 307 | | 307 | | 307 | |
| Adjusted r-squared | .195 | | .332 | | .398 | | .415 | |